{"id":6276,"date":"2026-05-29T20:33:36","date_gmt":"2026-05-29T16:33:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/?p=6276"},"modified":"2026-06-11T20:47:29","modified_gmt":"2026-06-11T16:47:29","slug":"29-05-2026-eng_analiz","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/2026\/05\/29-05-2026-eng_analiz\/","title":{"rendered":"REGIONAL TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: HISTORY AND PROSPECTS (Parts 17, 18, 19, and 20)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Samvel Meliksetian<\/strong><\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

(Continued. <\/em><\/strong>Beginning\u2026<\/mark><\/em><\/a><\/strong><\/em>)<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Part 17<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Developments in the communications situation following the Washington agreements of August 8, 2025<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The Washington meeting contributed to a noticeable de-escAlyation between the parties and created conditions for the first practical steps toward unblocking communications. As early as on October 21, 2025, the Azerbaijani side announced the lifting of all restrictions on rail transit of cargo to Armenia through its territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the initial phase, due to the lack of a direct rail link, the only route available was through Georgia. It was via this route that the first shipments of grain (from Kazakhstan and Russia) and fuel (from Azerbaijan) began arriving in Armenia. The Armenian side\u2019s initial concerns that the transit would be a one-time occurrence have not materialized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By March 2026, a sustainable trend had clearly emerged. Its logical continuation should be the development of reciprocal cargo flows from Armenia, which would signal a gradual normalization of transport and economic cooperation between the countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, structural constraints remain. High tariffs on the Georgian route, as well as the conflict surrounding Iran, which disrupted communication between the main territory of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, have once again brought the search for alternative routes to the forefront.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even before the situation surrounding Iran escAlyated, in November 2025, the Prime Minister of Armenia proposed opening road transit through Armenian territory between Turkey and Azerbaijan\u2014via the Alijan\u2013Margara checkpoint on the Turkish border and then on to Tegh (Kornidzor) \u2013 Lachin or Vardenis \u2013 Kelbajar on the Azerbaijani side. The reason for proposing these routes is the physical readiness of the infrastructure: The Margara\u2013Alijan checkpoint is set to be operational by 2025, while the other two routes were already in use until 2020 (and Lachin until 2023) and remain technically viable, unlike many other sections of the border where cross-border infrastructure was destroyed in the 1990s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the proposed routes have significant limitations. They traverse difficult mountainous terrain on both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides, which increases transportation time and costs. An additional factor is the remoteness of Azerbaijan\u2019s key logistics hubs (Yevlakh, Horadiz), which reduces their effectiveness as transit routes. As a result, in terms of time and logistics, these routes are inferior to alternatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The key question is whether the unblocking of transport routes will occur in stages\u2014prior to the implementation of the TRIPP project\u2014or whether all processes will be strictly tied to its launch.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the latter case, there is a risk of an indefinite freeze on one of the most significant items on the bilateral agenda. This is particularly critical given that the shortest road routes connecting Azerbaijan with the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic (as opposed to the significantly longer route through Iran) pass through Armenian territory, as do the most optimal routes for communication with Turkey.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, the following areas take on particular significance:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. Restoration of the Azerbaijan\u2013NAR railway connection via Georgia.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although this route is significantly longer than the one via Meghri, it remains the only viable rail option for the Baku\u2013Nakhichevan rail link until the launch of TRIPP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Proposal to restore direct rail service between Baku and Nakhichevan via Georgia and Armenia upon the restoration of the Yeraskh\u2013Sadarak section<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given that, following the construction of TRIPP, the operation of the Baku-Meghri\u2013Nakhichevan\u2013Kars line will require a large-scale modernization of the NAR railway network, launching transit traffic on the Yeraskh\u2013Sadarak route would allow this work to begin without delay. This will save time and reduce logistics costs, whereas modernizing the railway using freight trucks entails significant costs of various kinds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2<\/em>. Opening of the Lachin\u2013Goris\u2013Angeghakot\u2013Bichenek\u2013Nakhichevan road route.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This route is the shortest road link between the main territory of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. It served a similar function during the Soviet period as part of the A317 highway (Nakhichevan\u2013Yevlakh). Following the restoration of the Horadiz\u2013Khudafarin\u2013Lachin section, the route has become more direct and convenient compared to the Soviet-era version. The Azerbaijani side is also nearing completion of the Fizuli\u2013Lachin highway, which will further reduce travel time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, its key limitations remain the challenging mountainous sections. The most problematic sections are the switchbacks on the Zabukh\u2013Tegh (or Zabukh\u2013Kornidzor) segment, as well as a section approximately 13 km long (out of roughly 83 km of road through Armenian territory) between the village of Shahat and the border with the NAR, which requires major reconstruction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Additional challenges are associated with the border section near the Bichenek (Sisian) Pass, where demarcation, demining, and the establishment of border infrastructure are required. The pass itself, on both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides, remains a bottleneck on the route: the construction of a tunnel under the pass would reduce travel time by about 30\u201340 minutes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the shorter length of the described route (about 650 km), travel time turns out to be comparable to alternative routes. This is due to the complex terrain and the presence of several mountainous sections, whereas the route via Gazakh\u2013Ijevan\u2013Yerevan\u2013Yeraskh runs primarily through flat terrain and includes only one pass (Sevan).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Provided that the Armenian section of the road from Shahat to the Sisian Pass is restored, this route becomes the shortest connection between Baku and Nakhichevan\u2014about 650 km and approximately 10 hours and 30\u201340 minutes of travel time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Alternative route: Baku \u2013 Gazakh \u2013 Ijevan \u2013 Sevan \u2013 Yerevan \u2013 Yeraskh \u2013 Sadarak \u2013 Nakhichevan.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite its greater length, this route is the most stable and predictable from a logistics standpoint. Its key advantage is that most of the route is flat and features only one mountain pass (Sevan), making the road more comfortable for passenger transport as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An additional advantage is the presence of a railway station in Gazakh, which enables combined logistics: the delivery of cargo by rail to the border, followed by transshipment to road transport. However, with the opening of a full-fledged Baku\u2013Nakhichevan rail link via Tbilisi\u2013Gyumri\u2013Yeraskh, the significance of this factor will diminish.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The total length of the route is approximately 800 km, of which 480\u2013507 km cover the Baku\u2013Armenian border section; about 215 km cover the Kayan\u2013Yeraskh segment (via Sevan and Yerevan); and about 84 km cover the section along the Araks River to Nakhichevan. According to calculations based on navigation services, the total travel time is approximately 10 hours.
<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Part 18<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Projects whose discussion has gained relevance due to the war in Iran<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The ongoing instability south of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which threatens to become chronic, highlights the need to develop specific projects for reliable communication between \u201cmainland\u201d Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan exclave, as well as to enhance Armenia\u2019s transit significance. To address these challenges, several route options can be identified, as shown on the map below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Various routes for restoring road connectivity between Nakhichevan and the main territory of Azerbaijan<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

a) The Baku\u2013Gazakh\u2013Ijevan\u2013Yerevan\u2013Yeraskh\u2013Nakhichevan route is approximately 800 km long and takes about 10 hours and 10 minutes. It offers the best balance between distance and travel time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

b) The route via the Selim Pass (Kayan\u2013Yeraskh line) involves a journey of about 330 km through Armenian territory and takes approximately 5 hours and 20 minutes on this section. The total duration of the route exceeds 12 hours due to the challenging terrain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

c) The route via the Sisian (Bichenek) Pass is the shortest in terms of distance, but it is limited by difficult mountainous sections, where the last 13 km through Armenian territory (the village of Shahat to the Bichenek Pass) need to be restored.

d) The route via Sotk\u2013Yeraskh includes the Baku\u2013Sotk section, which is approximately 512 km long (about 8 hours and 15 minutes of travel time), followed by the Sotk\u2013Yeraskh section\u2014about 175 km (about 3 hours)\u2014and the Yeraskh\u2013Nakhichevan section\u2014about 85 km. The total length of the route is approximately 772 km, and the travel time is about 12 hours and 25 minutes. A significant drawback is the need to cross three mountain passes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

e) The Kornidzor\u2013Yeghegnadzor\u2013Yeraskh route proposed by the Armenian side includes approximately 410 km from Baku to Kornidzor (about 6 hours and 35 minutes), approximately 203 km from Kornidzor to Yeraskh (about 3 hours and 5 minutes), and approximately 85 km to Nakhichevan (about 1 hour 10 minutes). The total distance is about 690 km, and the travel time is approximately 11 hours 20 minutes. Despite the relatively short distance, the route passes through several difficult serpentine sections, which increases travel time and reduces its efficiency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition to the solutions mentioned, the Gazakh\u2013Ijevan section, approximately 31 km long, is of significant importance in the context of restoring direct rail service between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Given the predominantly flat terrain and favorable track profile, restoring this section does not pose significant technical challenges, allowing it to be considered a priority for immediate implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The significance of this section is determined by its proximity to the main centers of Armenia in the north and central parts of the country, as well as by the possibility of organizing a phased transportation scheme. In particular, even in the absence of through rail service on the Hrazdan\u2013Ijevan line, the restoration of the Gazakh\u2013Ijevan section will enable the delivery of cargo from Azerbaijan to Ijevan Station, followed by its distribution via road transport throughout Armenia. Thus, an intermediate logistics model is being formed that ensures partial integration of the railway infrastructure without the need for the simultaneous restoration of the entire line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It should be noted that a similar situation already existed during the Soviet period. From 1971 to 1986, the Ijevan station served as the terminus of the Gazakh branch line within Armenia, handling approximately 3 million tons of cargo annually. Further details on the restoration of transit between Armenia and Azerbaijan via this section, including issues related to the delimitation of this section of the border, are described in a separate article by the author, published on the Armenian Council\u2019s website (https:\/\/council.am\/en\/entry\/9263\/kazakh-ijevan-communications-past-and-present\/<\/mark><\/a>)<\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion from the above<\/em><\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

A comparison of the presented routes shows that the key factors for efficiency are not so much the distance as the terrain, the number of mountain passes, and the condition of the infrastructure, which directly affect travel time and the reliability of transport. In this context, it is advisable to identify two priority routes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first is the route via Gazakh\u2013Ijevan\u2013Yerevan\u2013Yeraskh, which is the most balanced in terms of overall parameters and offers the optimal balance of distance and time. An additional advantage is the minimal amount of work required to launch it: essentially, this involves restoring approximately 1.7 km of road on the border section in Tavush (Bala Jafarli\u2013Kayan), as well as about 500 meters on the Yeraskh\u2013Sadarak segment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second option is the route through the Sisian (Bichenek) Pass, whose main advantage is its shorter length. At the same time, its implementation requires a greater volume of work: within Armenian territory, a section of approximately 13 km in mountainous terrain must be restored, and the border between Armenia and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic must be demarcated along this section, along with the creation of the corresponding border infrastructure (checkpoint).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, the first route appears to be the fastest and least costly in terms of launch, while the second is potentially shorter but requires significantly greater investment and a larger volume of restoration work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under these circumstances, the Azerbaijani side can already at this stage consider the available options and express its interest in implementing the relevant projects. The restoration of damaged sections and the creation of border infrastructure inevitably take time, and delaying decisions\u2014even at the level of preliminary agreements\u2014could lead to a situation where developments \u2014 including in the context of a protracted conflict over Iran or other crises \u2014 will outpace the readiness of the infrastructure, leaving the parties facing the reality of limited transport capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Part 19<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Armenia\u2019s Transport Development Strategy in the Context of Regional Integration and Cooperation with the EU<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The years of the Karabakh conflict and the closure of Armenia\u2019s borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, as noted in previous parts of this publication, led to a significant deterioration of the transport links that connected Armenia with these countries and could have become part of key international transport routes in the west\u2013east, north-south, and west-south directions. This was accompanied by the country\u2019s de facto loss of transit functions within the regional transport system and its gradual exclusion from emerging transcontinental transport and logistics chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite attempts to adapt to these conditions and participate in international transit initiatives, Armenia has failed to implement a single major infrastructure project in the communications sector during its years of independence, leading to a growing structural lag behind neighboring countries that are actively integrating into international transport corridors. The only mega-project\u2014the \u201cNorth\u2013South\u201d highway \u2014 will be completed only by the mid-2030s; moreover, once communications between Armenia and Azerbaijan are unblocked, a decline in its strategic significance is inevitable given the emergence of more convenient alternative routes, including those through the territory of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The opening of the borders between Azerbaijan and Turkey will also inevitably raise the question of the shortest routes between these countries, and such routes pass precisely through the territory of Armenia, creating a unique window of opportunity to restore the country\u2019s transit function. This applies not only to railways but also to road and any other infrastructure. Specifically, this involves the need to modernize and effectively rebuild the existing route to the standard of a modern Category I\u2013II highway (capacity of 10,000\u201330,000 vehicles per day, with at least two lanes in each direction) along the so-called \u201cNorthern Route\u201d (Gazakh \u2014 Ijevan \u2014 Vanadzor \u2014 Gyumri \u2014 Kars). Currently, this road\u2019s technical parameters generally correspond to Category III, which is particularly critical on mountainous sections with steep gradients (the Dilijan\u2013Fioletovo section) and tight curves (the Jajur Pass section). Upgrading the road\u2019s category will not only reduce travel time between Baku and Kars to approximately 8 hours and shorten the distance by 100\u2013140 km compared to any alternative routes, but also establish a sustainable international highway capable of handling transit traffic between Turkey, the South Caucasus, and the Caspian region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even at this stage, it would be advisable for the Armenian side to initiate the development of a project to modernize the 165-kilometer section of the Akhurik\u2013Kayan highway, which could become a key element in the formation of a continuous Europe\u2013Turkey\u2013Armenia\u2013Azerbaijan road axis. This section represents one of the most efficient and shortest segments of the west\u2013east route passing through the territory of Armenia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The Kayan\u2013Akhurik highway is the backbone of the West\u2013East transport corridor.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A distinctive feature of this route is that, along its entire length, the most challenging section in terms of terrain remains the stretch near the Jajur Pass (part of the Kayan\u2013Akhurik line), where traffic travels along a winding road that limits the route\u2019s speed capabilities. At the same time, the Jajur Pass is not among the most difficult passes in Armenia during the winter, and is certainly not comparable in terms of the scale of engineering challenges to the most difficult mountain segments of the \u201cNorth\u2013South\u201d project.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The construction of a tunnel on the Jajur section would, first and foremost, reduce travel time, increase average travel speed, and improve the overall operational performance of the entire highway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, the modernization of a single, relatively limited section has the potential to significantly improve the efficiency of the entire Akhurik\u2013Kayan line, transforming it into a fully-fledged and competitive international transport corridor. In addition, the entire main line needs to be expanded to include two tracks for traffic in each direction, which is particularly relevant for the Aghstev River Gorge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The implementation of this project will not only establish a key link in the international west-east route but also create the conditions for the accelerated development of Armenia\u2019s northern regions\u2014Shirak, Lori, and Tavush\u2014which, until the 1990s, served as the country\u2019s second-largest industrial and demographic center after the Ararat Valley, with a population of approximately 0.9 million people in the early 1990s. Restoring their transit function and integrating them into international logistics chains could become one of the drivers of regional economic growth and more balanced territorial development in the country. The same applies to the western regions of Azerbaijan, centered on Ganja, for which the most optimal connection to Turkey via northern Armenia is the only viable option.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second key area involves developing long-term transport and logistics solutions to establish effective connections with European Union countries. Despite Armenia\u2019s participation in initiatives such as TRACECA, Global Gateway, and TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Network), the country lacks its own strategic projects. Despite EU financial support for the \u201cNorth-South\u201d initiative, this project within the framework of international transit routes is only valuable as long as Armenia\u2019s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey remain closed. Once borders and transport links are opened, emerging alternatives along the Araks Valley appear more preferable. Accordingly, strategic initiatives must be based on the logic of open transport links and the use of the most optimal regional routes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such initiatives should include the modernization of existing infrastructure to meet TEN-T standards (including requirements for speed, axle loads, and intermodality), as well as the creation of multimodal logistics hubs (rail\u2013road hubs, dry ports) that ensure the country\u2019s integration into supply chains between the EU, the Middle East, and Central Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the key challenges in the event of the potential opening of all borders is the difference in railway gauge: to the south (Iran) and west (Turkey) of Armenia, the European gauge of 1,435 mm is used, whereas in Armenia and the post-Soviet space, the gauge is 1,520 mm. This creates a structural barrier to the formation of continuous transport corridors. With high freight volumes, changing bogies or transloading can take anywhere from several hours to several days, creating bottlenecks and reducing the competitiveness of rail routes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Baltic states faced a similar problem, where a strategic decision was made to build a parallel European-gauge network\u2014Rail Baltica (870 km\u2014the first transport corridor under the European TEN-T initiative), connecting the countries to the EU\u2019s main railway infrastructure while preserving the existing 1,520 mm gauge network in parallel. A similar model has been implemented in Poland, where a broad-gauge metallurgical line (Linia Hutnicza Szerokotorowa, LHS) with a length of about 400 km and a 1,520 mm gauge has been in operation since the late 1970s, providing a direct connection to Ukraine. The example of Poland also demonstrates the functionally driven possibility of the coexistence of two railway standards even in the context of a long-established transition to the European standard.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even more relevant is the example of Ukraine and Moldova. In 2022, the EU launched the  Solidarity Lanes<\/strong> initiative  for these countries, with the long-term goal of transitioning the railway systems of Ukraine and Moldova to the European gauge. Thus, as part of the program, construction of the 80-km Mostyska II (border with Poland) \u2013 Sknyliv (Lviv Oblast, Ukraine) railway line is scheduled to be completed by 2027.

Including Armenia in the Solidarity Lanes program could be a significant step toward bringing Armenia closer to the EU, and the transition to European gauge also signifies a long-term strategic connection between the parties. It is also important to involve Azerbaijan in this program, without which the creation of a unified Kars-Masis-Julfa corridor is impossible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the case of Armenia, opening the border with Turkey creates a unique opportunity for integration into the expanding European gauge zone and the establishment of continuous rail service toward Europe and the Middle East. Given the need to develop ties with Iran, the creation of the Kars\u2013Julfa transit corridor with a 1,435 mm gauge would significantly increase the speed and efficiency of transport across the vast territory stretching from the Indian Ocean to France and Northern Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the current infrastructure is maintained, transport between Turkey and Iran will require a double change of bogies (in Julfa and at the Akhurik\u2013Dogukapi border crossing), which reduces the competitiveness of this route. In this regard, the creation of a continuous corridor with a single gauge becomes important not only for Armenia\u2019s connections with each of these countries, but also for their connections with one another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Part 20<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Once Again on the Priority of Communications Projects<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Returning to the assessment of various projects whose implementation has become relevant in the context of the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, it is important to note once again that the construction of a new Kars\u2013Diluju line (approximately 224 km) does not appear to be a priority solution from a rational standpoint. There are already several railway routes connecting Kars with Baku\u2014via Akhalkalaki, via Gyumri\u2013Tbilisi, and along the Gyumri\u2013Masis\u2013Nakhichevan\u2013Meghri line. The existing capacity of these routes (which create the effect of a multi-track railway) will more than suffice for the needs of the Middle Corridor in the coming decades. At the same time, creating an additional route does not eliminate the systemic limitations of the Turkish section or the problem of different track gauges in Turkey (as well as Iran), on the one hand, and in Armenia and Azerbaijan, on the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A more effective solution is the construction of a short (approximately 60 km) railway section from Kars toward Ani with access to the Armenian network in the Anipemza area. This would significantly shorten the Kars\u2013Baku route through Armenia and Nakhichevan, ensuring a more rational transport configuration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, the resources freed up could be directed toward modernizing the Divrigi\u2013Kars line within Turkey. Currently, its capacity (approximately 750,000 tons) is one of the main constraints of the Middle Corridor. Without modernizing this section, any new lines will not lead to systematic growth in freight traffic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A more ambitious and long-term railway project, similar to Rail Baltica, could be the construction of the Kars -Vanadzor\u2013Ijevan\u2013Aghstafa\u2013Alyat (approximately 670 km), which envisages the creation of a transit corridor with a track gauge of 1,435 mm from Kars to the Caspian Sea (the port of Alyat) through the territory of Armenia via the shortest (\u201cnorthern\u201d) route. This project will enable the transport of cargo from the port of Alyat to Europe without wasting time and resources on changing bogies with different gauges. If extended to Baku, it will also allow for the launch of direct passenger services to Turkey and Europe, significantly speeding up the entire process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, it is of fundamental importance that the transition to the 1,435 mm gauge can be carried out in parallel with the preservation of the 1,520 mm network, forming a dual-track transport system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

A project for two transport corridors through the territories of Armenia and Azerbaijan with a transition to the European 1,435 mm gauge: the northern corridor (a) to the Caspian Sea (Kars \u2013 Vanadzor \u2013 Gazakh \u2013 Alyat) and\u00a0 (b) the Kars\u2013Julfa corridor, with a route realignment on the Kars\u2013Getap section and the creation of the shortest route between Kars and Julfa.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among other long-term objectives for the development of rail transport, it is worth noting the transition of the catenary system from 3 kV direct current to 25 kV alternating current, which complies with international standards, reduces operating costs, and allows for the use of more powerful and technologically adapted locomotives. Specifically, this could involve Alstom\u2019s freight models adapted for the needs of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan\u2014the AZ8A and KZ8A\u2014and the AZ4A passenger model, which have already demonstrated good operational performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Additionally, the experience of Northern European countries can be taken into account, where specialized locomotives are used to operate in conditions of complex terrain and harsh climates. In particular, Swedish IORE locomotives, developed by Bombardier Transportation, are used to haul heavy trains (up to 8,000\u20138,600 tons in double-unit operation) in the Far North, characterized by low temperatures, complex track profiles, and high loads.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The use of such rolling stock, combined with the transition to a 25 kV power supply system and infrastructure modernization, would significantly increase average section speeds, allow for heavier trains, and ensure the efficient operation of the railway network in Armenia and eastern Turkey, where both mountainous terrain and cold winter conditions are common.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, the qualitative development of Armenia\u2019s transport infrastructure and its connectivity with its immediate neighbors depends on strategic planning and the country\u2019s integration into the emerging regional logistics system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The creation of standard-gauge corridors would enable Armenia to become a vital link between the European Union, the Middle East, and Central Asia, as well as a central element of the shortest route between Turkey and Iran, where Nakhichevan serves as a key transportation hub.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, maintaining the 1,520 mm gauge network and restoring northern routes through Georgia, Azerbaijan, and southern Russia helps preserve connections with the vast territory of the former USSR, including Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and others. In the medium and long term, this region is also of interest both for communications in this direction via Armenia and for the Armenian economy.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, the Turkey\/Georgia\u2013Armenia\u2013Nakhichevan\u2013Iran corridor opens up a new route for Eastern European countries and Russia to the ports of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, offering an alternative to existing routes via the Caspian Sea and the Suez Canal. The implementation of this model depends on the stabilization of the regional situation; however, if implemented, it will create a new architecture of transport flows in which Armenia becomes one of the key hubs of regional logistics. At the same time, the efficiency of transport routes used by other countries in the region will increase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusions and Outlook<\/em><\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, communications in the South Caucasus became fragmented against the backdrop of conflicts engulfing the region. This led to a sharp decline in regional flows and the isolation of the region\u2019s countries both from one another and from the wider world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the early 2000s, a trend toward the formation of new transregional connections has emerged. However, the choice of new routes was often determined not by geographical or economic expediency, but by political motives. At the same time, a significant portion of key transport routes\u2014both along the west\u2013east axis (Turkey\u2013Armenia\u2013Azerbaijan) and the north\u2013south axis (the route through Armenia and the NAR to Iran)\u2014remained closed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The end of the acute phase of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and the prospects for unblocking transport links between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran\u2014including the TRIPP project\u2014have the potential to significantly alter regional connectivity and stimulate economic growth in the South Caucasus. However, the dominance of politicized approaches continues to hinder the search for the most rational, flexible, and versatile solutions for connecting different parts of the region and neighboring areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This factor also undermines trust between the parties, forcing them to choose costly and suboptimal routes, the construction of which is dictated primarily by political reasons and the legacy of the conflict. In many cases, utilizing the territory of neighboring countries would allow for the same objectives to be achieved much more effectively. This logic is evident in the Kars\u2013Diluju\u2013Nakhichevan railway project, the Armenian \u201cNorth\u2013South\u201d highway project, and, previously, the Kars\u2013Akhalkalaki railway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the sphere of new infrastructure construction, the Azerbaijani side demonstrates strategic planning, technical solutions, and the ability to implement large-scale infrastructure projects within tight deadlines. At the same time, a shortcoming of the Azerbaijani approach remains the high degree of politicization of projects and the desire to maximize its own benefits by minimizing those of the Armenian side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This often leads to the selection of suboptimal options and creates a kind of \u201cfixation\u201d on specific routes and projects. The Armenian side, on the other hand, demonstrates significant inertia regarding the construction of new infrastructure. On the one hand, this is linked to the heavy legacy of the country\u2019s long-standing isolation, under which large-scale transport projects were long perceived as lacking practical value and did not become part of the state agenda. On the other hand, more limited financial capabilities, as well as concerns related to the lack of guarantees and coordination with the Azerbaijani side, also play a role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Agreeing on priority routes to be restored in a bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani format, taking mutual interests into account, could significantly change the situation. This would allow the Armenian side to begin restoring those transport links in advance, the use of which will be guaranteed after the final unblocking of borders and transport connections. This issue is particularly important given that even after political agreements are reached, it will take a significant amount of time to physically restore and launch transport links on the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the context of the Armenian-Azerbaijani unblocking, in addition to the railway through Meghri\u2014the main component of TRIPP\u2014other transport routes are also of great importance. These include the Lachin\u2013Tegh\u2013Angeghakot\u2013Bichenek route, capable of providing a short connection between the main part of Azerbaijan and the NAR; the Gazakh\u2013Ijevan section, providing the most direct and convenient link between Armenia and Azerbaijan; and the Gazakh\u2013Ijevan\u2013Vanadzor\u2013Gyumri\u2013Kars route as the shortest road connection between Azerbaijan and Turkey via northern Armenia. In all these cases, relatively small investments and limited construction work are required to initially launch the connections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The top priorities for restoring rail service include the restoration of the Yeraskh\u2013Sadarak section, which will allow for the organization of rail service<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Nakhichevan, as well as the Akhurik\u2013Dogukapy section to restore direct rail service between Armenia and Turkey. An equally important task is to plan the interim restoration of the Gazakh\u2013Ijevan line (approximately 31 km), and subsequently the entire Ijevan\u2013Hrazdan line, which will require significantly greater investment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With regard to the TRIPP project, it is important to note that the construction of a railway through Meghri should not merely involve the restoration of the Soviet-era line, but rather its significant modernization\u2014including straightening the route and building new tunnels. Otherwise, this section will be unable to provide high-speed transport and risks becoming one of the main \u201cbottlenecks\u201d in the South Caucasus transport system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The construction of the Fioletovo\u2013Vanadzor railway should also be considered a project of strategic importance. The implementation of this project will create the shortest railway link both along the west\u2013east (Azerbaijan\u2013Armenia\u2013Turkey\u2013Europe) and along the north\u2013south axis (Black Sea ports\u2013Armenia\u2013NAR\u2013Iran\u2013ports of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another priority task is the modernization of the Yeraskh\u2013Masis\u2013Gyumri railway to enable high-speed rail travel at speeds exceeding 100 km\/h.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Strategic objectives of a more long-term nature include cooperation with the EU within the framework of the TEN-T program, as well as Armenia\u2019s possible accession to the Solidarity Lanes initiative, following the example of Ukraine and Moldova. Unlike many other post-Soviet countries surrounded by states with a 1,520 mm standard gauge, the two largest markets adjacent to Armenia, Iran and Turkey, use the European standard gauge of 1,435 mm.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Connecting Armenia to both countries, as well as connecting them to each other via the territory of Armenia and the NAR with a continuous 1,435 mm gauge railway line, has the potential to significantly facilitate and accelerate transport along this axis, which is part of the historic transit route along the Araks River.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The goal of all these initiatives is to establish a comprehensive system of interconnected transport networks that ensures the selection of the most optimal routes and modes of transport for connecting various parts of the region with one another and with neighboring areas. Only such a system can ensure the full integration of regional transport networks into international and transcontinental transport corridors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another important area in this context is the creation of integrated management systems and the streamlining of transactional procedures within the South Caucasus and neighboring countries. Technical and logistical solutions to be implemented under the TRIPP project can serve as a model here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Without deepening integration processes, the South Caucasus and the Middle Corridor project will continue to lag behind both the maritime routes, which account for more than 95% of trade between China and Europe, and the northern land route through Russia, restrictions on the use of which may be temporary and lifted in the event of a normalization of relations between Russia and the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, it is important for the countries of the region not to miss this historic opportunity to establish a sustainable transit corridor in the South Caucasus capable of handling a portion of trade and economic flows along both north-south and west-east routes, while simultaneously fostering robust intra-regional connections.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Samvel Meliksetian (Continued. Beginning\u2026) Part 17 Developments in the communications situation following the Washington agreements of August 8, 2025 The Washington meeting contributed to a noticeable de-escAlyation between the parties and created conditions for the first practical steps toward unblocking communications. As early as on October 21, 2025, the Azerbaijani side announced the lifting of… Read More »REGIONAL TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: HISTORY AND PROSPECTS (Parts 17, 18, 19, and 20)<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":6201,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[151],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6276","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6276","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6276"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6276\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6278,"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6276\/revisions\/6278"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6201"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6276"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6276"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pressclubs.tv\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6276"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}